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"JAPAN'S Er1ERGENCE AS A GLOBAL HEAVY\~EIGHT" 
CTALKING PoiNTS) 
INTRODUCTION 
-- BEFORE OPENING THE FLOOR TO GENERAL DISCUSSION) I WOULD 
LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS WHICH I HOPE WILL HELP FOCUS 
THE DISCUSSION. 
-- As I AM SURE YOU ALL KNOW THERE IS NO STRONGER PROPONENT 
THAN I OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US- JAPAN RELATIONSHIP WHICH 
I OFTEN DESCRIBE AS OUR MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP) 
"BAR.NONE." 
-- IN THE YEARS AHEAD) THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP 
WILL INCREASE AS JAPAN'S POWER ~ND - ~N~LUE~CE GROWS. 
-- NEVERTHEL~SSJ I THINK THAT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT JAPAN AS AN 
"EMERGING GLOBAL HEAVYWEIGHT)" WE NEED TO KEEP CLEARLY IN MIND 
THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND TO DIFFERENTIATE 
THE ROLE THAT JAPAN IS LIKELY TO PLAY IN EACH ARENA IN THE FORE-
SEEABLE FUTURE. 
--THE TERM "GLOBA.L HEAVYWEIGHT" IMPLIES A NATION WHICH EXERTS 
GREAT INFLUENCE OVER THE FULL RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC) . . 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY/STRATEGIC ISSUES, .AT THE MOMENT ON LY THE US 
AND SOVIET UNION FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY) AND THE SoVIET UNION'S 
INFLUENCE IS LIMITED IN THE ECONOMIC ARENA . IN MY VIEWJ JAPAN IS 
BEST DESCRIBED IN THE BOXING METAPHOR AS 





A MIDDLE WEIGHT) EMERGING BY THE END OF THE CENTURY AS A LIGHT 
HEAVYWEIGHT, 
ECONOMIC 
JAPAN IS LIKELY TO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT IN THE DECADES AHEAD 
ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE 
DEVELOPSj BUT ITS INFLUENCE IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE PRE-
DOMINATLY IN THE ECONOMIC ARENA. 
EVEN HERE) IT WILL BE FACED BY SEVERE CHALLENGES. 
-- THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM FROM WHICH JAPAN HAS BENEFITED 
SO GREATLY IS UNDER SEVERE STRAIN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TAKING PLACE, SOME OF THIS DERIVES FROM AN 
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO RAPIDLY INCREASED ENERGY COSTSj 
SOME FROM STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIESj SOME 
FROM THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIESj SOME FROM THE PRECARIOUS 
DEBT POSITION AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF MOST NON-OIL EXPORTING 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIESj SOME FROM THE ECONOMIC FAILURES OF THE 
COMMUNIST SYSTEM, I HAVE NOT 1 I'M SURE 1 COVERED ALL THE FACTORS 
AND IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANY OF US TO FORESEE CLEARLY THEIR FUTURE 
IMPLICATIONS, BUT THAT WE NEED IMPROVED MEANS OF COORDINATION . 
AND COOPERATION) PARTICULARLY AMONG WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED 
COUNTRIES) IS INCREASINGLY SELF-EVIDENT, THIS WILL BE A MAJOR 
THEME OF THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT, 
-- IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT JAPAN IS BEING ASKED TO BEAR 
GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. THEY ARE 
APPROACHING IT WITH A CAUTIOUSNESS WHICH FRUSTRATES THEIR PARTNERS, 
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THEY ARE) WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION) CONCERNED THAT THEIR OWN 
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES CANNOT WITHSTAND A 
SITUATION IN WHICH EXTERNAL FORCES EXERT MORE CONTROL OVER THEIR 
DESTINY THAN DOES INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE, 
-- CURRENTLY ONE SEES THIS MOST CLEARLY IN TRADE FRICTION BETWEEN 
JAPAN AND ITS TRADING PARTNERS AND THE PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IT 
CALLS FORTH. 
-- IT IS STIMULATED BY THE BELIEF IN THE US AND EUROPE THAT JAPAN 
BENEFITS FROM EASIER ACCESS TO WESTERN MARKETS) PARTICULARLY OUR 
OWN) THAN IT ACCORDS TO FOREIGN PRODUCTS IN 1TS MARKET. THERE 
DOES REMAIN IN JAPAN A DEEP-SEATED BIAS AGAINST IMPORTS AND FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT THAT MAY ONCE HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE FOR A WAR-RAVAGED) 
ISOLATED ISLAND ECONOMY BUT IS CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE FREE 
WORLD'S SECOND LARGEST ECONOMIC POWER. 
-- THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM JAPAN FACES IS WHETHER IT CAN TAKE 
THE NECESSARY STEPS QUICKLY ENOUGH TO WARD OFF PROTECTIONIST 
PRESSURES THAT WOULD LIMIT JAPANESE EXPORTS AND THREATHEN A 
GLOBAL TRADE WAR. A LONGER-RANGE PROBLEM IS WHETHER JAPAN CAN 
MAKE A FULL COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATING ITSELF INTO THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY SO THAT IT CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN HELPING TO SUSTAIN THIS 
SYSTEM RATHER THAN SIMPLY BENEFITING FROM IT. To BE CREDIBLE 
JAPAN MUST ADDRESS BOTH OF THESE QUESTIONS NOW, 
-- IN ADDITION~ ALTHOUGH JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS OUTPACED . . . .. 
THAT OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS AND CONTINUES TO 
SHOW REMARKABLE RESISTANCE TO THE VIRUSES OF DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY) 
INCREASING UNEMPLOYMENT AND HIGH INFLATION THAT HAVE BESET MOST 
INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES IN RECENT YEARS) JAPAN IS NOT NECESSARILY 
IMMUNE FROM THESE PROBLEMS AND IN FACT THE JAPANESE VIEW THEIR 
ECONOMY) WHICH SUFFERED NEGATIVE GROWTH IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1981) 
AS UNDERGOING SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES, IT IS MY VIEW THAT BECAUSE 




OF ITS INNATE STRENGTHS JAPAN'S ECONOMY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO 
GROW AND ACQUIRE INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE, THE GREAT RISK IS 
THAT THE RESULTANT EXPECTATIONS ON THE PART OF ITS PARTNERS WILL 
OUTPACE ITS CAPACITY TO RESPOND, 
POLITICAL 
--IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, THERE ARE ALSO MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES 
ABOUT THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF JAPANESE INFLUENCE IN THE YEARS 
AHEAD. JAPAN STILL SPEAKS WITH A HESITANT AND OFTEN INARTICULATE 
VOICE AND HAS YET TO DEFINE FOR ITSELF A CLEAR INTERNATIONAL 
PO LIT I CAL ROLE I 
WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A REMARKABLE EVOLUTIO~ .. 
IN THE LAST 35 YEARS IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
IN THE INITIAL POST-WAR PERIOD, JAPAN SELDOM LOOKED BEYOND 
IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC NEEDS AND ITS BROADER FOREIGN POLICY WAS SIMPLY 
TO FOLLOW THE US, 
AFTER THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO JAPAN FLIRTED BRIEFLY WITH THE ILL-
CONCEIVED CONCEPT OF .tMNI-DIRECTIONALu DIPLOMACY, 
-- HoWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED" SHIFT IN THE LAST FEW YEARS BY 
JAPANESE LEADERS TO IDENTIFY JAPAN PUBLICLY 'AND CLEARLY WITH THE 
WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES, 
-- JAPAN'S STRONG RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
DEMONSTRATED ITS WILLINGNES S TO TAKE CONCRETE AND PAINFUL MEASURES 
AS PART OF THE VfESTERN ALLIANCE, AND JAPAN'S PERFORMANCE 
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ON THIS ISSUE WAS BETTER THAN THAT OF OUR WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES, 
THIS RESULT WAS NOT PRODUCED BY US PRESSURE) WHICH WASJ AS 
I HAVE NOTED) THE TRADITIONAL POST-WAR IMPETUS FOR JAPANESE ACTIONS) 
BUT BY THE DECISIONS OF GQJ LEADERS THAT IN TIME OF CRISIS IT 
WAS ESSENTIAL FOR JAPAN TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY ITS ALIGNMENT WITH THE 
WEST. 
-- WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF nWESTERN DEMOCRACIESJn 
HOWEVER) JAPAN HAS NOT CARVED OUT A DISTINCT NATIONAL FOREIGN POLCIY, 
IT CONTINUES TO WAIT FOR OTHERS) PARTICULARLY THE USJ TO TAKE THE 
LEAD AND THEN TO FOLLOW) SOMETIMES AT A COMFORTABLE DISTANCE, 
-- To BE SUREJ IN A FEW PARTICULAR AREAS WHERE SPECIAL FOREIGN 
POLICY AND NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONVERGE) SUCH AS WITH RESPECT 
TO THE MID-EAST AND DISAR~AMENTJJAPAN HAS SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH ITS 
OWN !DENT ITY I 
-- EVEN HEREJ HOWEVER) IT HAS NOT GONE FAR BEYOND RHETORIC AND 
SYMBOLIC GESTURES BECAUSE OF RECOGNITION OF ITS LIMITED ABILITY TO 
TAKE MEANINGFUL ACTIONS AND BECAUSE IT WISHES TO AVOID COMPLICATING 
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, 
-- I BELIEVE THAT IT IS CERTAIN JAPAN WILL PLAY A MORE ASSERTIVE 
POLITICAL ROLE IN THE YEARS AHEAD FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL INTEREST 
AS WELL AS NATIONAL PRIDE, 
ONE IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THAT A NEW GENERATION OF JAPANESE LEADERS 
IS EMERGING WHICH WANTS TO ESTABLISH A MORE INDEPENDENT COURSE) IN 
APPEARANCE) IF NOT SUBSTANCE, 
IN ADDITION) THE SECURE POLITICAL BASE OF THE LDP SHOULD , RESULT 
IN GREATER POLITICAL STABILITY THAN MOST OTHER INDUSTRIAL STATES) 
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STABILITY WHICH IS A PREREQUISITE FOR AN EFFECTIVE LONG-TERM 
FOREIGN POLICY, 
-- STILLJ THERE ARE MANY HISTORICALJ CULTURALJ DOMESTIC POLITICALJ 
AND GEOPOLITICAL OBSTACLES TO A "JAPAN AS #1" SCENARIO BEING 
REALIZEDJ AND IT IS HARD TO FORECAST IN WHAT AREAS JAPAN WILL 
ATTEMPT TO ~SSERT ITSELFJ AND TO WHAT DEGREE AND EFFECT, 
-- ONE AREA THAT BEARS PARTICULAR WATCHING IS JAPAN'S REALTIONS 
WITH WESTERN EUROPE. 
-- THIS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP IS REMARKABLY UNDERDEVELOPED IN 
VIEW OF THE POTENTIAL CONGRUITY OF INTERESTS, 
-- THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT BOTH THE JAPANESE AND THE EUROPEANS 
RECOGNIZE THIS POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIP AND WILL STRIVE TO OVERCOME 
THE HERITAGE OF NEGLECT AND PREJUDICE TO FIND AREAS OF COMMON CAUSE, 
-- lN ANY EVENTJ JAPAN's EMERGENCE AS A GLOBAL HEAVYWEIGHT IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENTJ ALTHOUGH A MORE 
POLITICALLY ASSERTIVE JAPAN WITHIN THE WESTERN FRAMEWORK IS CLEARLY 
ON THE HORIZON. 
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MILITARY 
-- IN THE MILITARY ARENA} JAPAN OF COURSE IS ESSENTIALLY A 
NON-PLAYER ON A GLOBAL SCALE} NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE LIMITED 
SIZE OF ITS ARMED FORCES BUT BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
POLITICAL LIMITATIONS ON THEIR USE, 
-- THIS IS CHANGING AT A PACE SLOWER THAN THE US WOULD LIKE BUT 
ONE THAT IS FASTER THAN MANY JAPANESE FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH, 
-- NEVERTHELESS JAPAN IS UNLIKELY TO ASSUME A REGIONAL MILITARY 
ROLE} MUCH LESS DEVELOP A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY} UNLESS 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONDITIONS CHANGE DRASTICALLY, 
INSTEAD IT WILL CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON DEVELOPING THE ABILJTYJ IN 
COOPERATION WITH USJ. TO ·DEFEND ITS IMMEDIA-T~ TE.RRITORY AND·. ADJACENT 
SEALANES, 
-- JAPAN IS HOWEVER LIKELY TO MAKE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT 
CONTRIBUTION TO NON-MILITARY AREAS OF SECURITY THROUGH ECONOMIC 
· ASSISTANCE TO STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREAS, 
-- THIS "coMPREHENSIVE SECURITY" APPROACH CANNOT OF COURSE SUBSTITUTE 
FOR INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITY} BUT WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS THIS 
CONTR !BUT I ON I 
-- lN ANY EVENT THERE IS NO LIKELY COMBINATION OF JAPANESE MILITARY 
DEVELOPMENT AND NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE THAT WILL PUT JAPAN IN THE 
CATEGORY OF A GEOPOLITICAL HEAVYWEIGHT BY THE END OF THIS DECADE 
AND PROBABLY THROUGH THE END OF THE CENTURY, MoREOVER I BELIEVE 
A CONTINUED LIMIT ED MILITARY ROLE FOR JAPAN IS IN THE INTEREST OF 
THE US} JAPAN} THE OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND INTERNATIONAL 
STABILITY IN GENERAL, 
-- THE KEY QUESTION IN THIS AREA} THEREFORE} IS WHETHER JAPAN CAN 
1. 
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TAKE THE LIMITED STEPS IN THE MILITARY AREA THAT WE HAVE BEEN 
URGINGJ STEPS THAT ARE NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO HELP MEET THE INCREASED 
SOVIET THREATJ BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY TO PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY 
OF THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCEJ I,E,J TO AVOID CoNGRESSIONAL PRESSURE 
FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS IN JAPAN OR OTHERWISE WEAKENING 
OUR COMMITMENT. 
--1 AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS ISSUE CAN BE MANAGED EFFECTIVELYJ 
PARTICULARLY IF THERE IS GROWING APPRECIATION IN THE US THAT THE 
PRESENT SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPANJ INCLUDING OUR ACCESS TO 
BASES IN JAPAN AND THE POLITICAL BOND IT CREATES WITH THIS KEY 
COUNTRYJ IS NOT A ONE-WAY STREET AND MAKES A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO 
US SECURITY. 
US ROLE 
-- IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING HOW LIKELY JAPAN IS TO EMERGE AS A 
GLOBAL HEAVYWEIGHTJ I BELIEVE IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT WE FOCUS 
ON THE INFLUENCE THE US CAN HAV~ IN DETERMINING THE ROLE THAT JAPAN 
WILL PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA OVER THE LONGER TERM, 
-- OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS N~T SIMPLY TO HAVE JAPAN ACCEPT 
MORE GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND PLAY AN EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
BUT TO ENSURE THAT A MORE ACTIVIST JAPAN IS SUPPORTIVE OF US INTEREST, 
-- THE KEY TO THIS IN MY JUDGMENT IS A COMBINATION OF STEADYJ WELL 
CONCEIVEDJ AND QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT OR PRESSURE TO ASSUME MORE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND A CONTINUING STRONG US LEADERSHIP ROLE, 
-- JAPAN FEELS VERY COMFORTABLE WITHIN THE US ECONOMIC AND 
; . -· ·. . 
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STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AS THIS HAS SERVED ITS INTERESTS VERY WELL, 
JAPANESE LEADERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
MUST BE ADJUSTED TO BE MORE IN TUNE WITH THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF 
US POWER~ THE NEW DEMANDS ON THE FREE WoRLD~ AND JAPAN'S INCREASED 
ABILITY TO ASSUME A GREATER ROLE. 
-- NEVERTHELESS JAPAN WANTS THE US TO CONTINUE TO LEAD~ AND IF WE 
ARE PERCEIVED AS ABANDONING OUR TRADITIONAL ROLE~ IT MAY FEEL 
FORCED TO LOOK FOR ALTERNATIVES. 
-- l'fE MUST REMEMBER THAT ABOVE ALL THE JAPANESE ARE PRAGMATISTS AND 
SURVIVORS~ AND ALTHOUGH OUR SHARED VALUES ARE AN IMPORTANT BOND~ 
ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES ARE LIKELY TO BE THE DETERMINING 
FACTORS IN JAPAN'S LONG-TERM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIENTATION, 
IN SUM~ WE MUST REMAIN AN ATTRACTIVE PARTNER. 
IN THIS CONNECTION~ WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO USE OUR ECONOMIC 
AND MILITARY WEAKNE$S AS A BASIS FOR EXPANDED JAPANESE EFFORT, 
ALTHOUGH WE CAN RIGHTFULLY DEMAND MORE OF .JAPAN IN BOTH . AREAS~ WE 
MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO CARRY A DISPROPORTIONATE BURDEN 
OF LEADERSHIP IF WE EXPECT JAPAN TO FOLLOW, 
WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT AN EXPAND~D JAPANESE ROLE WITHIN THE 
US-JAPAN AND WESTERN ALLIANCES WILL BRING WITH IT A JAPANESE DEMAND 
FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION IN AND INFLUENCE ON THE DECISIONS THAT 
AFFE(:T THEM; 
-- To BE VERY FRANK~ WE STILL HAVE THE TENDENCY TO REGARD "CONSULTATION" 
AS "INFORMING IN ADVANCE" AND TO ENCOURAGE A ~ORE ASSERTIVE JAPANESE 
ROLE ON THE ONE HAND WHILE EXPECTING JAPAN TO FOLLOW WITH LITTLE 
QUESTION US POLICY INITIATIVES, 
-- THE JAPANESE BEAR MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OFFERING 
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CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS AND IN ENSURING THAT THEIR VOICE IS 
HEARDJ AND THEY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN EFFECTIVE IN THIS REGARD, BUT 
WE ALSO NEED TO BE MORE SENSITIVE TO LEGITIMATE JAPANESE INTERESTS 
AND TAKE A LONGER-TERM AND MORE CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT APPROACH TO 
OUR DEALINGS WITH JAPAN, 
SUMMARY 
-- I HAVE TRIED TO POINT OUT A FEW OF THE FACTORS THAT MAKE EARLY 
EMERGENCE OF JAPAN AS A TRUE GLOBAL HEAVYWEIGHT UNLIKELYJ AND 
THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE US IN DETERMINING HOW JAPAN'S EXPANDING 
INFLUENCE IS APPLIED. 
-- I HAVE NOT MEANT TO DENIGRATE JAPAN'S ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WHICH 
IS AND WILL BE INCREASINGLY SUBSTANTIAL, I HAVE RATHER TRIED TO 
PUT THE QUESTION IN A MORE REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE, 
-- I WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS AND VIEWS, I SUGGEST. IN THE INTEREST 
OF A MORE-OR-LESS ORDERLY DISCUSSION THAT WE ADDRESS FIRST THE 
QUESTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH JAPAN IS LIKELY TO PLAY A 
SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED ROLE IN THE NEAR TERMJ AND THEN WHAT STEPS 
THE US CAN TAKE TO ENSURE THAT THIS ROLE IS SUPPORTIVE OF US INTERESTS, 
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